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Eco-Evolutionary Dynamics of a Population with Randomly Switching Carrying Capacity
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Environmental variability greatly influences the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a population, i.e. it affects how
its size and composition evolve. Here, we study a well-mixed population of finite and fluctuating size whose
growth is limited by a randomly switching carrying capacity. This models the environmental fluctuations be-
tween states of resources abundance and scarcity. The population consists of two strains, one growing slightly
faster than the other, competing under two scenarios: one in which competition is solely for resources, and
one in which the slow (“cooperating”) strain produces a public good that benefits also the fast (“freeriding”)
strain. We investigate how the coupling of demographic and environmental (external) noise affects the popula-
tion’s eco-evolutionary dynamics. By analytical and computational means, we study the correlations between
the population size and its composition, and discuss the social-dilemma-like “eco-evolutionary game” charac-
terizing the public good production. We determine in what conditions it is best to produce a public good; when
cooperating is beneficial but outcompeted by freeriding, and when the public good production is detrimental for
cooperators. Within a linear noise approximation to populations of varying size, we also accurately analyze the
coupled effects of demographic and environmental noise on the size distribution.
Keywords: population dynamics, evolution, ecology, fluctuations, cooperation dilemma, public goods
I. INTRODUCTION
The fate of populations is affected by a number of endlessly
changing environmental conditions such as the presence of
toxins, resources abundance, temperature, light, etc. [1, 2].
In the absence of detailed knowledge of how external fac-
tors vary, they are modeled as external noise (EN) shaping
the randomly changing environment in which species evolve.
The impact of fluctuating environments on population dynam-
ics has been studied in a number of systems [3–14], and sev-
eral evolutionary responses to exogenous changes have been
analyzed [15–21]. In finite populations, internal noise is an-
other important form of randomness, yielding demographic
fluctuations of stronger intensity in small populations than in
large ones. Internal noise (IN) is responsible for fixation [22–
24] (when one species takes over and others are wiped out)
and thus plays an important role in the evolution of a pop-
ulation’s composition. Ecological and evolutionary dynam-
ics are often coupled, through an interdependent evolution of
the population size and composition [25–31]. As a conse-
quence, environmental variability may affect the population
size and hence the demographic fluctuations intensity, thus
coupling EN and IN. The interdependence of environmental
noise and demographic fluctuations is particularly relevant for
microbial communities, whose properties greatly depend on
the population size and on the environment [1, 2]. These pop-
ulations often experience sudden environmental changes that
can drastically affect their size, e.g. by leading to popula-
tion bottlenecks under which the colony of reduced size is
more prone to fluctuations [32–35]. The coupling between
the different forms of randomness therefore generates feed-
back loops between socio-biological interactions and the en-
∗Electronic address: M.Mobilia@leeds.ac.uk
vironment [32, 33, 36, 37], which results in fascinating eco-
evolutionary phenomena such as cooperative behavior. For in-
stance, experiments on Pseudomonas fluorescens showed that
the formation and sudden collapse of biofilms promotes the
evolution of cooperation [34, 35, 38]. In most studies, how-
ever, EN and IN are treated as uncoupled [4–14].
Recently, we introduced a model describing a fluctuat-
ing population—consisting of a fast strain competing with a
slow (cooperating) species, that can produce a public good—
evolving under a randomly switching carrying capacity [39].
In this model, demographic fluctuations are coupled to EN, re-
sulting in a significant influence on the species fixation prob-
ability and leading to noise-induced transitions of the popu-
lation size. In the context of the eco-evolutionary dynam-
ics of this model, here we introduce the theoretical concept
of “eco-evolutionary game” to characterize the emergence of
cooperation in populations of fluctuating size. We study the
correlations between the population size and its composition
and show that a social dilemma of sorts arises: while the pub-
lic good production increases the overall expected population
size, it also lowers the survival probability of cooperators. In
the biologically-inspired setting of a metapopulation of non-
interacting communities of varying size, we measure the suc-
cess of each species in the eco-evolutionary game in terms of
its expected long-term number of individuals. We thus deter-
mine the circumstances under which public good production
(cooperation) is detrimental or beneficial to cooperators, and
find the conditions in which it is best to produce the public
good. Furthermore, we have devised a linear noise approxi-
mation that allows us to accurately characterize the population
size distribution and noise-induced transitions in a population
whose size fluctuates under the joint effect of coupled demo-
graphic and environmental noise.
The next two sections establish our approach: In section
II, we introduce our stochastic model; in section III, we out-
line the properties of the fitness-dependent Moran model and
piecewise deterministic Markov processes associated with the
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FIG. 1: (a) Cartoon of the eco-evolutionary dynamics of the model: the population consists of strains S (◦) and F (•), subject to K(t) ∈
{K−,K+} that randomly switches, see (4). After each switch of K(t),N and x change: following aK− toK+ switch, N increases and the
intensity of the internal noise decreases; the opposite occurs following a K+ to K− switch. (b) Typical random switching of K(t) according
to (4). (c) Sample paths ofN(t) (gray, dashed line) and x(t) (blue, solid line), corresponding to the switching portrayed in (b). We notice that
x evolves much slower than N , see text. Parameters are (s, ν,K+,K−, b) = (0.02, 0.1, 450, 50, 0).
model, and review how to combine these to compute the
species fixation probabilities. In the following two sections,
we present our main results: Section IV is dedicated to the
correlations between the population size and its composition,
and to the discussion of the emergence of cooperative behav-
ior along with an “eco-evolutionary game” in a population of
fluctuation size; in section V, we study the population size
distribution within a linear noise approximation. Our con-
clusions are presented in Sec. VI. Additional information is
provided in the Supplementary Material (SM) [40].
II. MODEL
As in our recent work [39], we consider a well-mixed pop-
ulation of fluctuating size N(t) = NS(t) + NF (t), consist-
ing of NS individuals of species S and NF of species, or
strain, F [42]. The fast-growing strain F has fitness fF = 1,
whereas the slow-growing strain S has a slightly lower fitness
fS = 1 − s, where 0 < s ≪ 1 denotes the (weak) selec-
tion intensity. At time t the fraction of S individuals in the
population is x(t) = NS(t)/N(t) and the average population
fitness is f¯ = xfS + (1 − x)fF = 1 − sx = 1 + O(1).
Here, the evolution of the population size N(t) is coupled to
the internal composition x(t) by a global growth rate g(x),
and its growth is limited by a logistic death rateN/K(t) [25–
27, 39]. The carrying capacity K(t) is a measure of the pop-
ulation size that can be supported, and is here assumed to
vary in time, see below. We specifically focus on two im-
portant forms of global growth rates: (i) the pure resource
competition scenario g(x) = 1, in which x andN are coupled
only through fluctuations; and (ii) the public good scenario in
which g(x) = 1 + bx, corresponding to a situation where S
individuals are “cooperators” [25–27, 41] producing a public
good (PG) that enhances the population growth rate through
the benefit parameter 0 < b = O(1), here assumed for sim-
plicity to be independent of s. In the PG scenario, N and
x are explicitly coupled, since the changes in the size of the
population (ecological dynamics) and those in its composition
(evolutionary dynamics) are interconnected. This interplay es-
tablishes a form of “eco-evolutionary dynamics” [28, 29]. It is
worth noting that, as customary in evolutionary game theory,
we assume that mutation rates of the strains are negligible, and
we thus characterize the population evolutionary dynamics in
terms of the fixation properties [24, 41].
In this context, the population size and composition change
according to the continuous-time birth-death process [26, 45,
46]
NS/F
T+
S/F−−−→ NS/F + 1 and NS/F
T−
S/F−−−→ NS/F − 1, (1)
with transition rates
T+S/F = g(x)
fS/F
f¯
NS/F and T
−
S/F =
N
K(t)
NS/F . (2)
We model environmental randomness by letting the car-
rying capacity K(t) switch randomly between K+ (abun-
dant resources) and K− < K+ (scarce resources), see figure
1(a,b). We assume that K(t) switches at rate ν, according
to a time-continuous symmetric dichotomous Markov noise
(DMN) [43, 44, 47] ξ(t) ∈ {−1,+1} (or random telegraph
noise):
ξ
ν−→ −ξ , (3)
The stationary symmetric DMN has zero-mean 〈ξ(t)〉 = 0
and autocorrelation 〈ξ(t)ξ(t′)〉 = exp(−2ν|t − t′|) (〈·〉 de-
notes the ensemble average over the environmental noise) [43,
344]. This is a colored noise with a finite correlation time
1/(2ν) [43, 44, 47–50], see Section 1 in SM [40]. As a re-
sult, the fluctuating carrying capacity reads
K(t) =
1
2
[(K+ +K−) + ξ(t)(K+ −K−)] , (4)
and endlessly switches betweenK+ andK−.
In what follows, we consider that the DMN is stationary:
〈ξ(t)〉 = 0 for t ≥ 0. Hence, the initial carrying capacity is
eitherK− orK+ with probability 1/2, and the average carry-
ing capacity is constant: 〈K(t)〉 = 〈K〉 = (K+ +K−)/2.
The DMNmodels suddenly changing conditions, reflecting
several situations in bacterial life, such as cells living at either
side of a physical phase transition [1], or in the ever-changing
conditions of a host digestive tract. In the laboratory, bac-
teria can be subjected to complex gut-like environment [54]
or simplified stressful conditions, typically through variable
exposure to antibiotics [55–57]. Furthermore, with modern
bioengineering techniques it is possible to perform controled
microbial experiments in settings allowing for sensible com-
parisons with theoretical models sharing some of the features
considered here (switching environment, time-varying popu-
lation size, public good production) [16, 17, 30, 36]. As dis-
cussed in Section IV.B, the setting where colonies of bacteria
are grown in arrays of wells or test tubes [30, 36], modeled as
a metapopulation of communities, is particularly relevant for
our purposes.
In this model, the population evolves according to the mul-
tivariate stochastic process defined by equation (1)-(4), which
obeys the master equation
dP ( ~N, ξ, t)
dt
= (E−S − 1)[T+S P ( ~N, ξ, t)]
+ (E−F − 1)[T+F P ( ~N, ξ, t)]
+ (E+S − 1)[T−S P ( ~N, ξ, t)]]
+ (E+F − 1)[T−F P ( ~N, ξ, t)]
+ ν[P ( ~N,−ξ, t)− P ( ~N, ξ, t)], (5)
where ~N = (NS , NF ), E
±
S/F are shift operators such
that E±SG(NS , NF , ξ, t) = G(NS ± 1, NF , ξ, t) for any
G(NS , NF , ξ, t), and similarly for E
±
F .
Equation (5) fully describes the stochastic eco-evolutionary
dynamics of the population, and can be simulated exactly (see
Sec. 2 in SM [40]).
Importantly, here demographic fluctuations are coupled to
the colored non-Gaussian environmental noise [39, 40] and
encoded in the master equation (5). This contrasts with the
discrete-time population dynamics of, for example Ref. [18],
where external and internal noises are independent and Gaus-
sian. Simulation results, see figure 1(c) and Ref. [62] (in
whichN(0) = 〈K〉, as in all our simulations), reveal that gen-
erallyN(t) evolves much faster than the population composi-
tion. We considerK+ > K− ≫ 1 to ensure that, after a tran-
sient, N(t) is at quasi-stationarity where it is characterized
by its quasi-stationary distribution (N -QSD). The population
eventually collapses after a time that diverges with the sys-
tem size [51, 52], a phenomenon that can be disregarded for
our purposes. Below we study the eco-evolutionary dynam-
ics in terms of the random variablesN and x, focusing on the
fixation properties of the population and its quasi-stationary
distribution.
It is useful to start our analysis by considering the mean-
field approximation which ignores all noise (say K = 〈K〉).
In this case, the population size N and composition x evolve
deterministically according to [26, 27, 39, 53]
N˙ =
∑
α=S,F
T+α − T−α = N
(
g(x) − N
K
)
, (6)
x˙ =
T+S − T−S
N
− xN˙
N
= −sg(x)x(1 − x)
1− sx , (7)
where the dot signifies the time derivative. Equation (7), rem-
iniscent of a replicator equation [24], predicts that x relaxes
on a timescale t ∼ 1/s ≫ 1 and eventually vanishes while,
according to equation (6),N(t) equilibrates toN(t) = O(K)
in a time t = O(1).
III. PIECEWISE-DETERMINISTICMARKOV PROCESS,
MORANMODEL & FIXATION PROBABILITIES
In this section, we review the effects of environmental and
demographic noise separately, and compound them to obtain
the fixation probabilities characterizing the population com-
position, as outlined in Ref. [39]. Here, these results provide
the necessary background for the discussion in Sections IV
and V of our main novel findings.
A. Environmental noise & Piecewise-deterministic Markov
process
If the population is only subject to external noise (EN), it
follows the bivariate piecewise-deterministic Markov process
(PDMP) [58], defined by (7) and
N˙ = N
{
g(x)− NK + ξN
(
1
K −
1
K+
)}
, (8)
where K = 2K+K−/(K+ + K−) is the harmonic mean of
K+ and K− [39]. Equation (8) is a stochastic differential
equation with multiplicative DMN ξ of amplitude N2(K+ −
K−)/(2K+K−) [40]; it reduces to the deterministic limit (6)
when the EN is removed (i.e. K+ = K−).
Although the process is only subject to EN, the global
growth rate g(x) couples the evolutionary and ecological dy-
namics. To simplify the analysis, we introduce an effective
parameter q ≥ 0 (see Section III C 2) and assume a constant
g ≡ 1 + q [39], obtaining the single-variate effective process
N˙ = F(N, ξ) =
{
F+(N) if ξ = 1
F−(N) if ξ = −1,
(9)
with F±(N) ≡ N
[
1 + q − N
K±
]
, (10)
4describing the evolution of a population of size N(t) subject
only to EN. According to (9) and (10), each environmental
state ξ has a fixed point
N∗(ξ) =
{
N∗+ = (1 + q)K+ if ξ = 1
N∗− = (1 + q)K− if ξ = −1,
(11)
After t = O(1), the PDMP is at stationarity, char-
acterized by a stationary probability density function
(PDF) p∗ν,q(N, ξ) (derived in the SM [40]). Central
for our purposes are the features of the marginal sta-
tionary PDF p∗ν,q(N) = p
∗
ν,q(N, ξ) + p
∗
ν,q(N,−ξ) ∝
N−2
[
(N∗+ −N)(N −N∗−)N−2
] ν
1+q−1 [53], giving the
probability density ofN regardless of the environmental state
ξ (see Section 3 of [40] for a derivation). Depending on
the sign of the exponent, the distribution may be unimodal
or bimodal [39], but has always support [N∗−, N
∗
+], on which
F+ ≥ 0 and F− ≤ 0.
B. Internal noise & Fitness-dependent Moran process
Internal noise stems from the inherent stochasticity of indi-
vidual birth and death events in the population; it ultimately
causes fixation (one strain taking over the whole population),
and hence determines the long-term population composition.
When internal and ecological dynamics are coupled, which
strain fixates has consequences on the population size, mak-
ing the fixation phenomenon particularly important.
If internal noise is the only source of randomness (constant
K), we can study its effects using the fitness-dependentMoran
model [22, 23, 41, 59, 60], with constant sizeN ≡ K [61]. To
keep the population size constant, at each birth corresponds a
death. Therefore, x increases by 1/N if an S individual is
born and an F dies (SF → SS at rate T˜+S = T+S T−F /N ), and
decreases by 1/N if an F individual is born, replacing a dead
S (SF → FF at rate T˜−S = T−S T+F /N ), with
T˜+S =
1− s
1− sxg(x)(1 − x)xN, T˜
−
S =
1
1− sxg(x)(1 − x)xN .
The corresponding mean-field equation is again (7). For an
initial fraction x0 of S individuals, in the framework of the
Fokker-Planck equation, the fixation probability of S is [22,
23, 41, 45] (see also Section 5.1 in SM [40])
φ(x0)|N = e
−Ns(1−x0) − e−Ns
1− e−Ns . (12)
The fixation probability of S thus becomes exponentially
smaller the larger the population’s (constant) size or selection
intensity s are; and, notably, is independent of g(x). In the
following we assume x0 = 1/2 and drop the initial condition
for notational simplicity: φ|N ≡ φ(x0)|N and φ ≡ φ(x0).
Clearly, the fixation probability of F is φ˜|N = 1 − φ|N . In
Section 5.1 of the SM [40], we also outline the main proper-
ties of the mean fixation times of the fitness-dependent Moran
model. The most relevant for our purposes is the fact that, in
both cases b = 0 and b > 0, the unconditional and conditional
mean fixation times scale as O(1/s) to leading order when
s≪ 1 and Ns≫ 1.
C. Fixation under switching carrying capacity
The strain S unavoidably goes extinct in the determinis-
tic limit, see equation (7), and has an exponentially vanishing
survival probability when K is constant, see equation (12).
However, when the carrying capacity switches, the population
undergoes “bottlenecks” that can enhance this probability [39]
and alter the long-term average population size.
1. Fixation probabilities in the pure competition scenario (b = 0)
When b = 0, both species compete for the same finite re-
sources, with a slight selective advantage to F . Therefore,N
and x are solely coupled by demographic fluctuations. After
a time t = O(1), N attains quasi-stationarity where it is dis-
tributed according to its N -QSD [62], that is well described
by the PDF p∗ν/s ≡ p∗ν/s,0(N). On the other hand, x relaxes
on a much slower timescale t ∼ 1/s ≫ 1 and we showed
that the mean fixation time scales as O(1/s) to leading order
when s ≪ 1 and 〈K〉s ≫ 1 [39, 40, 53]. As a consequence,
as shown in Section 5.2 of the SM [40], the population expe-
riences, on average, O(ν/s) environmental switches prior to
fixation (see figures S6 in [40] and 1(c)). When s ≪ 1 and
K− ≫ 1, we can thus exploit this timescale separation and
compute the S fixation probability φ by averaging φ|N over
p∗ν/s, with the rescaled switching rate ν → ν/s [39]:
φ ≃
∫ K+
K−
φ|N p∗ν/s(N) dN. (13)
The PDF p∗ν/s is sharply peaked at N ≃ K when ν ≫ s,
whereas it has two sharp peaks at N ≃ K± when ν ≪ s.
Equation (13) captures the limiting behavior φ
ν→∞−−−−→ φ|K
when ν ≫ s (many switches prior to fixation), resulting from
the self-average of the EN (since ξ(t)
ν→∞−−−−→ 〈ξ(t)〉 = 0), as
well as φ
ν→0−−−→ (φ|K−+φ|K+)/2 in the regime of rare switch-
ing (ν ≪ s), when the environment almost never changes
prior to fixation [39]. As shown by figure S2 in Section 2 of
the SM [40], equation (13) reproduces the simulation results
for the fixation probability of S within a few percent over a
broad range of ν values. While S remains less likely to fix-
ate than F , its fixation probability is much higher than in a
constant environment (φ≫ φ|〈K〉): environmental variability
considerably offsets the evolutionary bias favoring F .
2. Fixation in the public good scenario, b > 0
In the public good scenario, g(x) = 1 + bx with 0 < b =
O(1), S individuals act as public good producers (coopera-
tors). The higher x, in fact, the higher the reproduction rate of
5FIG. 2: (a) q(b) vs. b for s = 0.02 (cyan) and s = 0.05 (yellow),
see text. (b) φ vs. ν in the case b > 0: for (s, b) = (0.02, 0.2) (blue,
◦), (0.02, 2) (green, ), (0.05, 0.2) (orange, ⋄), (0.05, 2) (red, ∇).
Symbols are φ from simulations (104 runs) and solid lines show φq
from the effective theory, see text. In all panels, other parameters are
(K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
both strains, see equations (2). However, since S bears alone
the metabolic cost of cooperation (PG production), it grows
slower than F and, deterministically, x decreases.
When b > 0, N and x are explicitly coupled, and they do
not evolve on separate timescales: N is a fast variable, en-
slaved to the slow-varying x [62]. To determine the fixation
probability, in Ref. [39] we devised an effective approach,
based on suitably choosing the parameter q (0 ≤ q ≤ b) and
setting g(x) ≡ 1 + q in equation (8). This decouples N and
x in an effective population whose size distribution, at quasi-
stationarity and for any ν, is well described by the PDMP PDF
p∗ν,q(N). As outlined in Ref. [39], the fixation probability of
S within this effective theory is determined similarly to the
case b = 0 and is given by φq =
∫ N∗+
N∗
−
φ|N p∗ν/s,q(N) dN .
As above, this expression simplifies in the limiting regimes of
frequent/rare switching: φq ≃ φ(∞)q ≡ φ|(1+q)K when ν ≫ s,
and φq ≃ φ(0)q ≡ (φ|N∗
−
+ φ|N∗
+
)/2 when ν ≪ s. We deter-
mined the effective parameter q = q(b) for given (K±, s, b)
by matching the prediction of φ
(∞)
q with the results of simu-
lations (see [39] and SM [40]). Figure 2(a) shows that q(b)
increases almost linearly with b, and depends weakly on s.
Clearly, q(0) = 0 when b = 0, and φq thus reverts to (13).
Figure 2(b) shows that the effective approach captures the
effects of the coupling betweenN and x for several choices of
b and s, over a broad range of ν. As detailed in the SM [40],
the predictions of φq agree within a few percent with simula-
tion results when s ≪ 1, while the accuracy deteriorates as
s and b increase, therefore lowering φ. In fact, increasing b
yields higher q(b), which results in effectively increasing the
carrying capacity K± → (1 + q(b))K±. In the ν → ∞, 0
limits, this is equivalent to rescaling the selection intensity as
s → (1 + q(b))s, as inferred from φ(∞,0)q and equation (12).
Therefore φ decays (approximately) exponentially with b, as
shown by figure 3(a).
IV. CORRELATIONS & COOPERATION IN THE
ECO-EVOLUTIONARY GAME
After a time t≫ 1/s, fixation has very likely occurred and
the population composition is fixed and consists of only F or
S individuals. In this quasi-stationary regime, the population
size N(t) however keeps fluctuating, driven by the randomly
switching carrying capacity K(t). When the slow strain S
produces a public good (PG), the long-time eco-evolutionary
dynamics is characterized by the correlations between the
population size and its composition. In this section, we an-
alyze the long-term dynamics by computing the correlations
first, and then by analyzing the ensuing “eco-evolutionary
game”.
To this end, it is useful to consider the average population
size 〈N〉∗ν,b for given ν and b, after a time t ≫ 1/s, when the
population is at quasi-stationarity and consists of only S or
F individuals, see Section 5.2 in SM [40]. Within the PDMP
approximation—that is, approximating the evolution of N by
the PDMP (9), see Section 6.1 of SM [40]—we can compute
the quasi-stationary average of N using the PDMP PDF p∗ν,q
(see also Sec. VA):
〈N〉∗ν,b = (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
+ φ˜b〈N〉∗ν,0 > 〈N〉∗ν,0, (14)
where 〈N〉∗ν,0 is the population long-time average in the ab-
sence of PG production, φb denotes the fixation probability of
S for a public good parameter b, and φ˜b = 1 − φb. Through
equation (14), the PDMP approximation thus predicts that the
long-term population size increases with b, see figure 3(b).
Furthermore, while the fixation probabilities φb and φ˜b can in-
crease or decrease with ν, the PDMP approximation predicts
that the average population size at stationarity monotonically
decreases with ν (see (S20)-(S22) in the SM [40]). Simulation
results shown in figure 3(b) confirm that 〈N〉∗ν,b increases with
b, and decreases with ν (keeping other parameters constant).
A. Correlations between ecological & evolutionary dynamics
Equation (14) also highlights how fixation probabilities af-
fect the long-term average population size. When b > 0, there
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FIG. 3: (a) φ vs b in lin-log scale for s = 0.02, ν = 0.1 (orange,
◦) and ν = 10 (cyan, ∇); s = 0.05, ν = 10 (yellow, ). Lines are
from φq , see text, and markers are from simulations. (b) 〈N〉
∗
ν,b vs.
ν for b = 0 (cyan, squares), b = 0.2 (blue, circles) and b = 2 (green,
triangles) and s = 0.02. Solid lines are from (14); empty symbols
are from simulations; filled symbols are from (25) within the linear
noise approximation. Dashed lines indicate the predictions of (14)
in the regimes ν → ∞, 0, see Section 6.1 in [40]. Parameters are
(K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
are nontrivial correlations between population size and com-
position, and how N(t) and x(t) are correlated is of direct
biological relevance, see e.g. [30, 31].
Prior to fixation, these correlations are accounted by the ef-
fective parameter q(b) (see section III C 2). Here, we inves-
tigate their effect after fixation using the rescaled connected
correlation function
Cν,b(t) = 〈(N(t)− 〈N(t)〉) (x(t) − 〈x(t)〉)〉〈N(t)〉〈x(t)〉 , (15)
where 〈·〉 denotes the ensemble average. When 〈N(t)x(t)〉 =
〈N(t)〉〈x(t)〉, i.e. in absence of correlations, Cν,b(t) van-
ishes. At quasi-stationary, t ≫ 1/s, we have 〈N(t)x(t)〉 →
〈Nx〉∗ν,b, 〈N(t)〉 → 〈N〉∗ν,b, x→ 1 or 0 with respective prob-
ability φb and φ˜b, 〈x(t)〉 → φb and Cν,b(t)→ C∗ν,b. Within the
PDMP approximation, using eq. (14) and φb ≃ φq , equation
(15) becomes (t≫ 1/s)
C∗ν,b =
〈Nx〉∗ν,b
〈N〉∗ν,bφb
− 1 ≃
φ˜q
[
(1 + b)〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
− 〈N〉∗ν,0
]
(1 + b)φq〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
+ φ˜q〈N〉∗ν,0
. (16)
Since 〈N〉∗ν,0 is decreasing in ν (see figure 3(a)), this long-
term correlation is always positive for b ≥ 0, and vanishes
only for b = 0.
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FIG. 4: (a) C∗ν,b vs b for s = 0.05 and ν ≃ 1 (cyan, ⋄), ν = 0.1
(yellow, ∇); s = 0.02 and ν = 1 (red, ), and ν = 0.1 (orange,
◦). (b) C∗ν,b vs ν for b = 2 and s = 0.05 (red, ∇), s = 0.02 (green,
△); b = 0.2 and s = 0.05 (orange, ⋄), s = 0.02 (blue, ◦). In all
panels, the parameters are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5). Symbols
are results from simulations and solid lines are from equation (16);
dashed lines in panel (b) denote the analytical predictions of Cν,b in
the limits ν ≪ s and ν ≫ 1, see text.
As shown in figure 4, C∗ν,b grows approximately linearly
with b and is non-monotonic in ν with a maximum for ν =
O(1); all features that equation (16) captures well. The ν-
dependence of C∗ν,b stems from the fact that φb increases or
decreases with ν, depending on the value of s, see figure 2(b)
[39]. In the limiting regimes ν → ∞, 0, equation (16) sim-
plifies and yields C∗ν,b ≃ b[1 − (1 + b)φ(∞,0)q(b) ] [40]. There-
fore, in these the limiting regimes C∗ν,b increases in s, and
scales as O(b), as shown by figure 4, yielding 〈Nx〉∗ =
(1 +O(b))〈N〉∗ν,bφ(∞,0)q(b) .
These results show that, when species S provides a PG,
there are nontrivial long-term correlations between ecological
and evolutionary variables: the population size is shaped by
its composition. The correlations between N and x are max-
imal in the intermediate switching regime where ν = O(1)
is comparable to the growth rate of N , and are weaker in the
limiting switching regimes, on which we devised the effective
theory of section IIIC 2.
7B. When is cooperation beneficial? In which conditions is it
best to cooperate?
Producing the public good (PG) slows the growth of the
S strain, see equation (7) with g(x) > 0, and thus reduces
exponentially the fixation probability of S, as shown in fig-
ure 3(a). On the other hand, the PG leads to higher aver-
age population sizes (see equation (14) and figure 3(b)) and
therefore provides a long-term benefit to the whole popula-
tion. At the population level, a “social dilemma” [24, 41] of
sorts arises after fixation of either F or S: Cooperators pay
a cost through their reduced fixation probability, while they
provide a benefit, through the PG, by increasing the expected
long-term number of individuals of both strains. We analyze
the trade-off between benefit and cost of cooperation by intro-
ducing the notion of “eco-evolutionary game” in the context of
a metapopulation of non-interacting communities: Each sys-
tem realization (simulation run) corresponds to a community
of time-fluctuating size, and the collection of the system’s re-
alizations constitutes the metapopulation [26, 27, 30, 31, 37],
that is an ensemble of non-interacting communities. After fix-
ation, each community consists of only S or F individuals.
It is worth emphasizing that the social dilemma arising in the
eco-evolutionary game differs from traditional games in a fi-
nite population of constant size [24, 41]: Although F is al-
ways more likely to fixate than S (when x0 is not too close
to 1, as in classical evolutionary games), communities con-
sisting only of individuals of strain S can be of significantly
larger size than those containing only F ’s thanks to their pro-
duction of PG (allowing them to possibly attain the maximum
carrying capacity (1 + b)K+). In this eco-evolutionary game
in a population of time-varying size, we thus propose to mea-
sure the evolutionary success of a strain in terms of the pop-
ulation size averaged after fixation over the ensemble of non-
interacting communities, see also Section 6.2 of the SM [40]:
The expected payoff of the game is hence the relative long-
term average number of individuals of each strain, see below.
Interestingly, this formulation of the eco-evolutionary game
is of potential direct relevance to microbial experiments in
which colonies of bacteria, some of which can produce a pub-
lic good, are grown and compete in “a metapopulation of test
tubes”, see e.g. [30, 31, 36, 37].
Below, we use the PDMP approximation and simulations
to investigate the relative abundance of each species at quasi-
stationarity (see also Section 6.1 in [40]).
The average number of F individuals at quasi-stationarity,
given a switching rate ν and PG parameter b is
〈NF 〉∗ν,b = 〈N |x = 0〉∗ν,b = (1 − φb)〈N〉∗ν,0,
i.e. the average population size conditioned to F fixation.
Similarly, the average number of cooperators S at quasi-
stationarity is
〈NS〉∗ν,b = 〈N |x = 1〉∗ν,b = (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ν/(1+b),0.
In the context of the above eco-evolutionary game, we pro-
pose to measure the expected payoff provided by the PG as
the difference between the expected number of individuals of
a strain at quasi-stationarity when b > 0 relative to the case
b = 0. Hence, the expected payoff to F is
∆Fν,b ≡ 〈NF 〉∗ν,b − 〈NF 〉∗ν,0 = (φ0 − φb)〈N〉∗ν,0 > 0. (17)
Since φ0 > φb, see figure 3(b), this quantity is positive and in-
creases with b. This means that, as in other social dilemmas,
see, e.g., Refs. [24, 41], the benefit of “freeriding” increases
when the level of cooperation, here given by b, is raised. How-
ever, this does not rule out the possibility that, under certain
circumstances, the PG production can be either beneficial or
detrimental to S, and even permits S to be better off than F .
In fact, the eco-evolutionary expected payoff for cooperators
reads
∆Sν,b ≡ 〈NS〉∗ν,b − 〈NS〉∗ν,0
= (1 + b)φb〈N〉∗ν
1+b ,0
− φ0〈N〉∗ν,0, (18)
and clearly varies nontrivially with ν and b. Unless ∆Sν,b >
0, the PG is actually detrimental for cooperators: the expected
number of S individuals is lower than it would be without PG.
In this context, the PG benefits cooperators only if the increase
in the average population size offsets the decrease in fixation
probability, i.e. if
∆Sν,b > 0⇔ (1 + b)
〈N〉∗ ν
1+b ,0
〈N〉∗ν,0
>
φ0
φb
In figure 5, we show that∆Sν,b is non-monotonic in b, gener-
ating a maximum at an optimal value b∗(ν, s), which defines
the conditions where PG production is the most rewarding for
cooperators. Moreover, we observe a definite critical thresh-
old bc(ν, s), belowwhich producing a PG benefits cooperators
since∆Sν,b > 0.
Using our effective theory, φ ≃ φq(b), and the PDMP ap-
proximation, the expected payoff of S (18) reads
∆Sν,b = (1 + b)φq(b)
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν
1+b
(N) dN
− φ0
∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν(N) dN . (19)
When ν → ∞, the DMN self-averages (ξ → 〈ξ〉 = 0) and
equation (18) is given by the expected payoff of S in a popu-
lation of effective size 〈N〉∗∞,0 = K, see equation (S23) in the
SM [40], yielding∆S∞,b = [(1 + b)φ
(∞)
q(b) − φ
(∞)
0 ]K. Hence,
when the DMN self-averages, the expected payoff of S is pos-
itive if φ
(∞)
q(b) > φ
(∞)
0 /(1 + b).
Results in figure 5 show that equation (19) approximates
well the simulation results over a broad range of parameters.
The root and the maximum of equation (19) provide (approx-
imate) predictions for bc and b
∗, see figures 6 and S7(a) in
the SM [40]. These figures reveal that bc and b
∗ depend non-
monotonically on ν and vary greatly with s, both behaviors
well-captured by the theory. Figures 5 and S7(b) [40] also
show that the maximal payoff for S can be significantly higher
than that of F , especially when the selection s is low.
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FIG. 5: (a) ∆Sν,b vs. b for s = 0.02 and switching rates ν = 10
(cyan, ∇), ν = 1 (red, ), ν = 0.1 (orange, ◦). Predictions from
equation (19) (solid) are compared to simulation results (symbols).
The grey dashed line corresponds to the predictions of ∆S∞,b, see
text. We find ∆Sν,b > 0 when 0 < b < bc(ν, s) with an optimal
payoff for S when b = b∗(ν, s), e.g. (bc, b
∗) ≈ (4.9, 2.1) at ν = 1.
(b) ∆Sb,ν vs. b with ν ≃ 0.44, for s = 0.02 (blue, ∇), s = 0.03
(red, ⋄), and s = 0.05 (green, ◦). Solid lines are from equation (19)
and symbols are simulation results (see SM [40]). (c) Expected pay-
offs ∆Sν,b and ∆Fν,b vs. b for s = 0.02 obtained from equation
(19). Dashed lines show the values of b∗, β and bc. In all panels, the
parameters are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
In order to discuss the properties of the eco-evolutionary
game, it is useful to determine the value b = β(ν, s) of equal
expected payoff, i.e. such that which ∆Sν,β = ∆Fν,β , see
figure 5(c). From equations (17)-(19), we find that β(ν, s) is
the solution of
1
1 + β
(
2φ0
φq(β)
− 1
)
=
〈N〉∗ ν
1+β ,0
〈N〉∗ν,0
=
∫K+
K−
Np∗ ν
1+β
dN∫ K+
K−
Np∗ν dN
. (20)
So β is a nontrivial function of ν and s, see figure 6(b).
Given the parameters b and s of the eco-evolutionary game,
we have studied the values of the switching rate ν for which
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FIG. 6: (a) bc vs ν. Symbols are results from simulations and solid
lines are from equation (19) for s = 0.02 (blue), s = 0.03 (orange),
and s = 0.05 (green). (b) Heatmap of (∆Sν,b − ∆Fν,b)/〈N〉
∗
ν,0,
from equation (19) for s = 0.02. The gray dotted line shows b =
bc(ν, s), the dashed line b = β(ν, s) and the solid line b = b
∗(ν, s).
In the blue area (phases (i) and (ii)), b > β and F is better off than
S (∆Fν,b > ∆Sν,b). PG production is detrimental for S in phase
(i) where b > bc and ∆Sν,b < 0; beneficial for S (∆Sν,b > 0)
in phase (ii) where β < b < bc, but more beneficial for F (higher
expected payoff). In the red/pink area of region (iii), b < β and
S is better off than F (∆Sν,b > ∆Fν,b), see text. Colored dots
correspond to “gaps” in the numerical data (see [40]). Parameters
are (K+,K−, x0) = (450, 50, 0.5).
it is beneficial to cooperate by producing a public good, and
determined three distinct phases represented in the diagram of
figure 6(b):
(i) When b > bc, the PG production is detrimental for S.
The cost of cooperation outweighs its benefits and the
expected payoff for S is negative (∆Sν,b < 0). The PG
thus benefits only F .
(ii) When β < b < bc, the PG production benefits S, but
benefits F more (0 < ∆Sν,b < ∆Fν,b).
9(iii) When 0 < b < β, S reaps a higher expected payoff than
F (∆Sν,b > ∆Fν,b > 0). In this case, the benefit of the
PG outweigh its cost, and its production is favored.
Within the above metapopulation interpretation of the eco-
evolutionary game, species F effectively exploits S in phases
(i) and (ii), but is at a disadvantage in phase (iii). Since the
expected payoff to S is positive in regions (ii) and (iii), we say
that cooperation of a public good with benefit parameter b is
beneficial when 0 < b < bc(ν, s), and advantageous for 0 <
b < β(ν, s). Given a set of parameters (b, ν, s), PG production
is the best strategy if two conditions are met: (a) the expected
payoff of S is higher than that of F , which is satisfied in phase
(iii); (b) b yields the maximum possible payoff for S, i.e., b =
b∗. Hence, in an environment switching at rate ν and under
a selection intensity s, the best conditions to cooperate for
the public good production is when the PG benefit parameter
satisfies b = b∗(ν, s) < β(ν, s), represented by the solid gray
line in phase (iii) of figure 6(b). It is also worth noting that this
discussion also holds when the time-varying population size
is not driven by the environmental noise: The limiting case
ν →∞, for which the DMN self-averages and the population
reaches an effective size N → K, corresponds to the right
end of the diagram of figure 6(b) where ν ≫ 1. Remarkably,
environmental stochasticity yields several additional regimes
in which cooperating becomes beneficial.
In the above context of a well-mixed population whose size
fluctuates in time, this eco-evolutionary game shows that there
are conditions under which PG production is beneficial for co-
operators, and may even be the optimal strategy. This does not
imply that the social dilemma, which still holds in its classi-
cal form prior to fixation, is resolved in general. However,
this demonstrates that under environmental variability there
are conditions in which cooperation (PG production), albeit
disadvantaged in the short term, can be more successful than
freeriding in the long term. In fact, although freeriders have
a constant growth-rate advantage over cooperators and are al-
ways more likely to fixate (assuming x0 = 1/2), here, the
selective bias can be efficiently balanced by environmental
variability, by allowing cooperators to be successful in form-
ing, in the long term, larger communities than freeriders [40].
This can result in a greater increase of the long-term average
number of cooperators than free-riders, and exemplifies the
potential role of a fluctuating environment on the emergence
of cooperative behavior in microbial communities.
V. LINEAR-NOISE AND PDMP APPROXIMATIONS TO
THE POPULATION QSD
After t ≫ 1/s, the population is likely to be at quasi-
stationarity with its composition fixed [39]. Yet, the popu-
lation size still fluctuates and N(t) is distributed according to
its quasi-stationary distribution. When K− ≫ 1, the popula-
tion size is always large and, in the first instance, demographic
fluctuations are negligible compared to environmental noise.
In this case, eq. (9) characterizes reasonably well, albeit not
fully, the long-term properties of N(t).
A. Linear-noise approximation about the PDMP predictions
Throughout this work (and in [39]), we have shown that the
PDMP approximation p∗PDMP,ν,b(N) = φp
∗
ν,b(N) + φ˜p
∗
ν(N)
reproduces many characteristics of the quasi-stationary size
distribution (N -QSD). However, as p∗ν and p
∗
ν,b only account
for the external noise (EN), they cannot reproduce the com-
plete N -QSD, which is also subject to internal noise (IN).
Here, we use the linear noise approximation (LNA) about the
PDMP predictions to account for the joint effect of the two
noise sources, IN and EN, on the N -QSD.
The LNA is widely employed to quantify the effect of weak
demographic fluctuations in the absence of external noise [45,
46], and has recently been used to study the joint effect of
decoupled internal and external noise [12]. Here, we show
how to generalize the LNA to the case where the population
size fluctuates and demographic fluctuations are coupled to
the external noise.
For our analysis, we assume that K+ & K− ≫ 1, so that
〈K〉 is large and of the same order as K± (see Section 7 in
SM [40] for details). It is convenient to work with the con-
tinuous random variable n = N/Ω, where Ω = 〈K〉 ≫ 1
is the system’s “large parameter”. The auxiliary Markovian
process {n(t), ξ(t)} that we consider for the LNA is defined
by n
T +−→ n + Ω−1, n T
−
−→ n − Ω−1 and ξ ν−→ −ξ, where
the transition rates T ± are given by equations (S30) in the SM
[40]. We also introduce ψ = limΩ→∞N/Ω = O(1), which
obeys the stochastic differential equation (S33) [40] defining
the corresponding PDMP, and the random variable η(t), cap-
turing the fluctuations of n about ψ, according to
n(t) = ψ(t) +
η(t)√
Ω
, (21)
We are interested in the (quasi-)stationary joint probabil-
ity density π∗ν,q(η, ψ, ξ) of the process {n(t), ξ(t)}. This
probability density can be decomposed into π∗ν,q(η, ψ, ξ) =
π∗(η|ψ, ξ)π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ), where π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ) = Ωp∗ν,q(Ωψ, ξ) is
the stationary joint PDF of the PDMP {ψ(t)} and is read-
ily obtained from the PDF of equation (9). The station-
ary probability density π∗(η|ψ, ξ) accounts for the demo-
graphic fluctuations about {ψ(t)} in the environmental state
ξ. Following Ref. [12], we assume that the demographic fluc-
tuations are approximately the same in both environmental
states, i.e. π∗ν,q(η|ψ, ξ) ≃ π∗ν,q(η|ψ,−ξ), and simply denote
π∗ν,q(η|ψ) ≡ π∗ν,q(η|ψ,±ξ). This assumption is reasonable
whenK+ andK− are of the same order, and yields
π∗ν,q(η, ψ, ξ) ≃ π∗(η|ψ)π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ). (22)
With this approximation, the quasi-stationary marginal LNA
probability density of {n(t)} is
π∗ν,q(n) =
∑
ξ=±1
∫ ∫
dψdη π∗(η|ψ)
× π∗ν,q(ψ, ξ) δ
(
n− ψ − η√
Ω
)
, (23)
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FIG. 7: Histograms of the population size distribution (N -QSD)
when b = 0 (shaded area) compared with the predictions of the LNA
(solid), from equation (S39) of the SM [40], and with the PDMP
predictions (dashed), from p∗ν,0, for different switching rates: (a)
ν = 0.01, (b) ν = 0.1, (c) ν = 1, (d) ν = 10, see text. Param-
eters are (K+,K−, s, x0) = (400, 100, 0.02, 0.5). Here, K = 160.
where π∗(η|ψ) = exp{−η2/(2ψ)}/√2πψ (see SM [40]
for details), and the Dirac delta ensures that (21) is satis-
fied. Calling p∗LNA,ν,0(N) = π
∗
ν,0(n)/Ω and p
∗
LNA,ν,b(N) =
π∗ν,b(n)/Ω, explicitly given by eqs. (S39) and (S40) in SM
[40], the LNA quasi-stationary probability density reads
p∗LNA,ν,b(N) = φp
∗
LNA,ν,b(N) + φ˜p
∗
LNA,ν,0(N). (24)
Within the LNA, the quasi-stationary average population
size is obtained by averagingN over p∗LNA,ν,b(N):
〈N〉∗LNA,ν,b =
∫ ∞
0
Np∗LNA,ν,b(N) dN , (25)
where, it is worth noting, the integral is no longer restricted to
a finite support. As figure 3(b) shows, 〈N〉∗LNA,ν,b is as good
an approximation of simulation results, as its PDMP counter-
part 〈N〉∗ν,b from equation (14). This is not surprising, and as
done in Section IV, it is convenient to compute the averages
of N using the PDMP approximation, i.e. by averaging over
p∗PDMP,ν,b(N) as in eq. (14). However, as elaborated below,
the LNA via the equation (24) gives an excellent characteriza-
tion of the full N -QSD, well beyond the scope of the PDMP
approximation.
B. LNA,N -QSD, and noise-induced transitions
1. Pure resource competition scenario, b = 0
In the pure resource competition scenario (b = 0),
p∗LNA,ν,0(N) = π
∗
0(n)/Ω provides an excellent approxima-
tion of theN -QSD in all switching regimes, as shown in figure
7. In particular, p∗LNA,ν,0 captures the noise-induced transition
arising about ν = 1 [39, 43, 44]: When ν < 1, the switching
FIG. 8: Histograms of the population size distribution (N -QSD)
when b = 2 (shaded area) compared with the predictions of the LNA
(solid), from eq. (24) and equations (S39) and (S40) in the SM [40],
and with the PDMP predictions (dashed) based on the PDF p∗ν,q, with
q = b (when x = 1) and q = 0 (when x = 0), for different switching
rates: (a) ν = 0.01, (b) ν = 0.1, (c) ν = 1, (d) ν = 10. Parameters
are (K+,K−, s, b, x0) = (400, 100, 0.02, 2, 0.5). For the analytical
results, we have used the expression of φq for φ(b) ≃ φq(b).
rate is lower than the population growth rate, and the N -QSD
and p∗LNA,0 are both bimodal, with peaks at N ≈ K±, see
figure 7 (a,b). When ν > 1, the switching rate exceeds the
population growth rate, and theN -QSD and p∗LNA,ν,0 are thus
unimodal, with a peak at N ≈ K, see Figure 7(c,d).
Figure 7 also shows that p∗LNA,ν,0(N) accurately predicts
the peaks, their width and intensity, and the skewness of the
N -QSD, whereas the PDMP predictions from p∗ν,q(N) only
captures the position of the peaks. This demonstrates how
demographic fluctuations, aptly accounted for by the LNA,
cause the discrepancies between the N -QSD and p∗ν .
2. Public-good scenario, b > 0
The LNA expression (24) also provides an excellent ap-
proximation of the N -QSD in all switching regimes for the
public good scenario (b > 0), see figure 8. In particular,
p∗LNA,ν,b captures the noise-induced transitions arising about
ν = 1 and ν = 1+b [39]: When ν < 1, both conditional pop-
ulation distributions (for fixations to S or F ) are bimodal, with
different peaks. N -QSD and p∗LNA,ν,b thus have four peaks at
N ≈ K± and N ≈ (1 + b)K±, see figure 8(a,b). When
1 < ν < 1 + b, the S-conditional distribution is bimodal,
whereas the F -conditional distribution is unimodal. The N -
QSD and p∗LNA,ν,b thus have three peaks at N ≈ (1 + b)K±
and N ≈ K, see figure 8(c). Finally, when ν > 1 + b,
both conditional distributions are unimodal, but with differ-
ent peaks. Hence, the N -QSD and p∗LNA,ν,b are bimodal with
peaks atN ≈ K and N ≈ (1 + b)K, see figure 8(d)
As figure 8 shows, p∗LNA,ν,b(N) provides a faithful charac-
11
terization of the N -QSD also when b > 0. This reiterates that
the discrepancies with the PDMP approximation stem from
demographic fluctuations. We also notice that the accuracy of
the LNA slightly deteriorates near the lower-intensity peaks
at high N and low ν (see figure 8(a)). These correspond to
rare events, usually beyond the scope of the LNA. Moreover,
in those regimes, some assumptions made in the derivation—
e.g. equation (22)— reach the limit of their validity, see SM
[40].
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a pop-
ulation subject to a randomly switching carrying capacity in
which one strain has a slight selective advantage over an-
other. In a model inspired by microbial communities evolv-
ing in fluctuating environments, we have considered two
scenarios—one of pure resource competition (no interaction
between strains) and one in which the slow (cooperating)
strain produces a public good—and investigated the coupled
effect of demographic and environmental noise.
The population composition has been characterized by the
fixation probabilities, computed using the analytical proce-
dure devised in Ref. [39], and, when a public good is pro-
duced, shown to be non-trivially correlated with the evolution
of the population size. As a result, the production of public
good gives rise to an eco-evolutionary game: On the one hand,
producing the public good lowers the survival/fixation proba-
bility of cooperators; on the other hand, it also increases their
population size. A social dilemma of sorts therefore ensues
and, in a fluctuating environment, it is a priori not intuitively
clear whether there are circumstances under which it is bene-
ficial to produce a public good and what these conditions may
be. Since we consider the eco-evolutionary game in a popula-
tion of fixed composition (after fixation) but whose size fluc-
tuates, we have proposed to measure the evolutionary benefit
of the public good in terms of the long-term expected number
of individuals of each strain. This is done in the biologically-
inspired setting of a metapopulation of non-interacting com-
munities of varying size composed uniquely by one of the
species. In certain circumstances, that we have determined,
the public good production allows the communities composed
of cooperatingS individuals to achieve a greater long-term in-
crease of their average size than the communities consisting of
freeriding F individuals. In these conditions, we say that the
cooperating strain outcompetes the freeriding one. We have
thus determined, both analytically and with simulations, the
circumstances under which cooperation is beneficial or detri-
mental to public good producers, as well as the conditions un-
der which it is the optimal strategy. Hence, we have demon-
strated that the rate of switching, along with the selection in-
tensity and the public good parameter, determine when one
species is more successful than another. Our analysis of the
“eco-evolutionary game” thus shows that in a fluctuating pop-
ulation the evolutionary success of a strain goes beyond hav-
ing a growth-rate advantage and a higher fixation probability.
We have also advanced the characterization of the popula-
tion size distribution by generalizing the linear noise approxi-
mation to populations of fluctuating size, thus accounting for
demographic fluctuations about the predictions of the under-
lying piecewise deterministic Markov process. While we have
found that the linear noise and the piecewise-deterministic
Markov process approximations describe the average popu-
lation size equally well, only the former fully characterizes
the population size distribution. In fact, the linear noise ap-
proach accounts for the joint effect of environmental and de-
mographic noise and has allowed us to capture the width and
skewness of the population size distribution.
This study shows that coupled environmental and demo-
graphic noise can greatly influence how the composition and
size of a population evolve. In particular, social interactions
between strains—such as public good production—can lead
to intricate eco-evolutionary dynamics, which potentially sup-
port cooperation. This sheds light on phenomena that are di-
rectly relevant to microbial communities, which often feature
coupled internal and ecological evolution. This can yield the
kind of eco-evolutionary game analyzed here, that can be a
potential theoretical framework for experimental studies in-
vestigating the emergence of cooperative behavior in micro-
bial communities of time-fluctuating size.
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